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ExPlAInIng EVEntS In nARRAtIVES: 
thE ImPACt OF SCAFFOlDIng In 4 tO 12 OlD yEAR ChIlDREn
The focus of this article is the manner in which 4 to 12 year old children deal with the “evalua-
tive” component of narratives (labov & Waletsky, 1967). After spontaneously telling their first 
version of a story of a misunderstanding between two characters, constructed on the basis of 
a sequence of five images, children participated in a scaffolding procedure during which  they 
were questioned about the reasons for the events. After this non-intrusive, Piagetian-styled 
clinical interview, children were asked to recount the story a second time. For children’s first 
narratives, our study confirms earlier results by showing that, before 8-9 years, children rarely 
mention the epistemic states of the characters.  The false belief of one of the characters and 
its rectification are rarely mentioned before10-11 years and even at that age by few children.  
Presenting a story based on a misunderstanding does not facilitate this kind of narration. 
however, in the narrative produced after scaffolding, 6-7 year old children increase consider-
ably their references to the characters’ internal states, and from 8-9 years, the expression of 
false belief and of its rectification. These results call for multiple evaluations in order to best 
grasp children’s narrative competence.
Key words: children’s narratives, development of narrative competence, evaluative component 
of narratives
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Introduction
This work deals with children’s ability to recount a coherent story based on a 
series of images, a story that accounts for the events integrating into the narrative 
plot the points of view of the different characters, their intentions and beliefs. In 
other words, it will focus on what labov and Waletsky (1967) and labov (1972) 
have called the evaluative component of the story, and Bruner the “landscape of 
consciousness” (1986: 14) by which the narrator takes the perspective of the char-
acters and talks about the events in terms of their emotions, intentions and beliefs 
about them. Indeed, although recounting a succession of events provides the basic 
4 EDy VEnEzIAnO,  ChRIStIAn hUDElOt
facts, what ensures the meaning of the story is the placement of these elements in 
relation to each other and to the point of view of the characters (see, for example, 
Berman & Slobin, 1994; Berman, 2004).
many studies have looked at children’s narratives based on images, in particular 
those of the Frog story – “Frog, Where Are you?” (mayer, 1969) – (e.g., Berman & 
Slobin, 1994; Strömqvist & Verhoeven, 2004). They have shown that pre-school age 
children are able to organize their story according to a labovian-type of narrative 
structure with an initial background, a plot development and a resolution.  young 
children produce mostly descriptive narratives. From  about 6-7 years of age, children 
begin to express causal connections, an ability which improves progressively until 
9-10 years (e.g., Bamberg, 1994; Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; Berman & Slobin, 
1994; Berman, 2004; François, 2004).  In addition, if children between 4 and 7 years old 
can already attribute mental states to the characters of a story (Bokus, 2004; Richner 
& nicolopoulou, 2001), it is usually around 8-9 years that they use these internal 
states to explain behaviors (Bamberg, 1994; Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; Berman 
& Slobin, 1994; Charman & Shmueli-goetz, 1998; Kemper, 1984).  It is even later that 
children express that different characters can have different perspectives on the same 
events, that the narrator and the characters do not have the same knowledge, or that a 
character can have a false belief about an event (Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 2004; Kielar-
turska, 1999; Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; Küntay & nakamura, 2004).
These late developments cannot be considered due to lack of basic competences in 
these children since it is known that, in natural settings, children can produce narra-
tives (although simple and structured by the conversational exchange) and explana-
tions by the end of the second, beginning of the third year, and that they show also 
signs of awareness of the inner states of others (Eisenberg & garvey, 1981; Franco, 
2001; miller & Sperry, 1988; O’neill, 1996; Sachs, 1983; Veneziano, 2001; Veneziano & 
Sinclair, 1995; Wellman, 1990), an ability that becomes clearer around 4-5 years when 
children succeed in solving “false belief” tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
These developmental décalages relative to children’s behavior in natural settings 
can be understood if we consider that constructing a story on the basis of a series of 
pictures, using linguistic structures appropriate to express the causes and consequences 
of events, sometimes requiring to present different points of view on the same real-
ity, and doing all that in an integrated, monological narrative, is a complex activity. 
And indeed several variables intervene in the more or less precocious appearance of 
the evaluative component in children’s narratives, as for example, the content to be 
recounted, the nature of the communicative situation or of the modality in which 
the story is presented (e.g., Berman, 1995, 2004; Eaton, Collis & lewis, 1999). Thus 
children who do not account for events in terms of the characters’ internal states 
might not do so because the important cognitive and linguistic resources mobilized 
by the narrative activity itself would leave little room for explicit accounts, evalua-
tions or confrontation of the characters’ mental states (e.g., Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 
2004; Berman, 2004).  The results of Eaton et al.’s study (1999) go in the direction 
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of this hypothesis. They found that in the experimental group, where children are 
asked questions about the internal states of the characters following each scene of 
the story, 5 year olds could talk about the characters’ internal states more than the 
control children. In their study, however, narratives are produced “in bits and pieces”, 
which certainly diminishes the complexity of the narrative task, easing the demands 
on memory and on the cohesion constraints of the monological narrative.
In the present study we retain the demands of the monological narrative while 
introducing two characteristics likely to facilitate taking into account the internal 
states of the characters. On the one hand, the nature of the story used is based on 
a misunderstanding between two characters who have a different understanding 
of a key event.  Recounting the misunderstanding should elicit reference to inten-
tions and to beliefs about the intentions of the other character. On the other hand, 
we have introduced a scaffolding procedure aiming to focus children’s attention 
on the causes of events, without providing, however, any explicit reference to the 
internal states of the characters. 
Would the nature of the story allow an earlier expression of internal states and 
their implication in the explanation of events?  Do these types of behavior appear 
more frequently and more precociously after a scaffolding procedure that focuses 
children’s attention on the reasons of the key events?  And if the children improve 
on these dimensions, are these improvements a function of development?
Method
Subjects
37 children from Poitiers and Paris schools, divided into four age groups, par-
ticipated in the research reported here (see table 1). 
The Stone story
The “Stone on the Path” story we used is made up of five wordless pictures (see 
Appendix 1)1. The sequence can be recounted simply at a descriptive level, but its 
1 The story is part of a collection intended for 3-5 year old children (Furnari, 1980).
table 1. number of subjects per age group
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overall meaning can best be understood if it is narrated as a story of misunderstand-
ing involving the attribution of intentions and of false beliefs to the characters.
Procedure
Each child first saw the five images of the story, presented one after the other 
on a computer screen. Each image appeared first in large format in the middle of 
the screen, then positioned itself on the upper part of the screen in reduced size 
(the Appendix depicts the final arrangement).  At the end, the set of five images 
remained on the screen for two minutes. The child was told that he would have 
to narrate the story he understood from the pictures when the pictures would not 
be in view anymore. When the child considered himself ready s/he told the first 
narrative.  The experimenter didn’t interfere in any way at this stage but could 
show the pictures again (up to three times for a period of 20 seconds) if the child 
requested it. 
Then, during the scaffolding phase, the researcher, taking into account what 
the child had expressed in the first narrative, questioned the child on the reasons 
of the events.  For example, if the child had mentioned the fact that P1 had pushed 
P22, the experimenter said: “you told me that the boy pushes the girl.  how come?” 
If the child did not answer, the experimenter would add:  “he comes along and 
pushes her. Do you do that?”.  Concerning the “pushing back” event:  “Do you 
understand why the girl pushed the boy?”. The experimenter didn’t provide any 
answer himself. Finally, the child was asked to recount the story once again (the 
second narrative).
The entire interviews were audio recorded  and were transcribed verbatim.
Method of Analysis
The analyses presented focus on children’s expression of internal states, on 
the role they have in the explanation of events, on the expression of the fact that a 
character holds a false belief and and on its rectification, leading to the resolution 
of the misunderstanding. 
Identification of internal states
Four types of internal states were identified:
a) physical states (phy), referring to sensations (e.g., he hurt himself) and to 
perceptions (e.g., he did not see the stone);
b) emotional states (emot), like, for example, he is angry, he is happy, he is not 
happy;
c) intentional states (int), referring of the characters’ intentions or absence of 
intentions (e.g., he did not do it on purpose; he wanted to push him);
d) epistemic states (epi), referring to beliefs, knowledge or lack of knowledge 
by the characters. These can be about a “world state” (e.g., he did not know 
2 P1 represents the character that stumbles on the stone and P2 the other character.
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how he had fallen) or about the internal state of a character (e.g., he thinks 
he pushed him on purpose), which constitutes a mental state attribution of 
second order (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985).
Explanatory relationships
As in other studies, we considered explanatory not only relations that were 
marked explicitly by causality connectors or expressions, but also those juxtaposed 
relations that can be interpreted in discourse to provide explanatory connections 
(see, for instance, gross & nazarensky, 2004). A set of explicit criteria was used to 
identify relations where the explanatory interpretation dominates over an inter-
pretation in purely temporal terms. This is definitely the case when the temporal 
succession of events is reversed, or when the child introduces into his narrative 
elements that do not come directly from the images presented, which seems to be 
constructed by the child to account for the dynamics of the depicted events.
The identification of an explanatory relation requires a condition sine qua non 
stating that the components must necessarily present a semantic relationship such 
that one can be considered the cause, the reason or the motivation of the other. Ex-
planatory connections were then identified whenever the relationship was expressed 
in a retroactive manner (e.g., Schlesinger, Keren-Portnoy & Parush, 2001; Veneziano, 
1999), from the explanandum – what is to be explained – to the explanans – that 
which explains it, as in this case the expression of the relationship does not follow 
the temporal succession of events and cannot be interpreted simply in these terms 
(Veneziano & hudelot, 2005a).
When the relationship is expressed in a proactive manner (from the antecedent 
to the consequent), at least one of the following three criteria had to apply:
– there was an explicit causal marker: “for that reason”, “since”, therefore”, 
“because of” (e.g., he stumbles and that’s why he pushes him; since he pushed 
him, the other pushes back).
– the antecedent of the relationship was an internal state (e.g., he believes he 
did it on purpose and he pushes him on the pebble; he doesn’t see the stone 
and he falls on the other one) since the “event” put forth as a reason seems 
to be created by the child for that purpose;
– an internal state was expressed as a consequence, or else the components 
of the explanation were related by an inherent physical relationship (for 
example, stumbling and pushing). In these cases the antecedent and the 
consequent must have been connected at least by the multifunctional marker 
“and”.
Explanatory use of internal states
For each type of internal state we determined whether or not it was used within 
an explanatory relation, if it was given as the reason or as the consequence, or if it 
was at the same time the consequence of an event and as the reason for another.
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False belief and rectification of false belief
The expression of the false belief was identified when the child not only at-
tributed to P2 a belief about the intentions of P1, something already captured by 
the coding of internal states (see above, e.g., he believes that he did it on purpose), 
but when he expressed also the fact that the first push has a physical cause (e.g., 
he stumbles on a pebble and he pushes the other child; then the other child /…he 
believes that he did it on purpose).  given that the child presented the event as it 
“objectively” happened, he not only attributes a belief to P2, but he also sets the 
background conditions to understand that this belief is false.
The rectification of the false belief (RFB) was coded when the child had P1 negate 
the supposed belief state of P2 (e.g., I didn’t push you) and/or, let it be known that P2 had 
been in a different belief state (e.g., Oh, pardon me, I thought you did it on purpose).
Results
As mentioned, the Stone story was recounted differently by children. Before 
going into more specific results we present some examples of the diversity of the 
overall narratives gathered. 
Examples of narratives
There is a tendency to think that pictures are transparent and that it is enough 
to look at them to know what the story is about.  But, as François (2001) puts it, “the 
perceived object […] is not given as such, but is “thought”” (ibidem: 96) since images 
do not indicate either reference or  (I would prefer: do not indicate reference nor) 
the connections between different representations (e.g., Bresson, 1981; Deleau, 1990). 
Thus, narratives produced on the basis of pictures require a lot of interpretation on 
the part of the narrator, concerning the identification of the situation, of the objects, 
of the characters and of the actions represented by the static images as well as, to 
an even larger extent, concerning the causes and reasons of the events and of the 
characters’ behaviors.  It is thus the narrator who connects the pictured elements and 
constructs a narrative tissue into which these elements are inserted. Thus, although 
the majority of the narratives collected share a basic plot, some children interpreted 
the images in a rather different way as, for example, in Example 1:
Example 1 – WES 5;7
Il le pousse euh : // pa(r)c(e) que / pa(r)c(e) que / pa(r)c(e) que et ben i voulait 
lancer la pierre / et puis // et puis après // non // i voulait lancer la pierre / i 
l’a poussé // et l’autre il l’a encore poussé pour la lancer // et après / i l’a / i l’a 
lancée sur sa main.
he pushes him, uh: // cause / cause / cause well he wanted to throw the stone 
/ and then // and then afterwards // no // he wanted to throw the stone / he 
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pushed him // and the other one he pushed him again to throw it // and after-
wards / he threw it on his hand.
Children that interpret the context, characters, objects and actions in a “stan-
dard” way (see appendix 1) may tell, nevertheless, the story in rather different ways. 
Below are examples of the variety of narratives recounted by children of different 
ages, with the explanatory component becoming more important with age:
Example 2 – hUg 4;9
c’est l’histoire d’un / p(e)tit garçon / et d’une p(e)tite fille / avant i sont joyeux 
après i font la bagarre / et après c’est fini // i pleure l’autre / après i rejouent 
à la fin. 
It’s the story of a / l’il boy / and a l’il girl / before they’re happy then they get 
in a fight / and later it’s over // and the other one’s crying / and then they’re 
playing together again at the end. 
Example 3 – lOU 5;1
là i // tombe / i tombe // (pas?) // et puis // et puis après l’autre // i // tombe // et 
puis après l’autre il le fait tomber / après i r(e)deviennent amis
There he // falls / he falls // (doesn’t he?) // and then // and then after the other 
// he // falls // and then the other one he makes him fall / and then they get to 
be friends again.
Example 4 – ODI I 6;5
Y avait / un / une fille et un garçon// et / après la / le garçon il a poussé la fille 
/ la fille elle est tombée par terre // elle s’est mise à genoux / il l’a relevée // et 
puis après // elle est // i sont redevenus amis.
There was / a / a girl and a boy // and / then the / the boy he pushes the girl / 
the girl she fell down on the ground / she got on her knees / he picked her up 
// and then next // she is // they become friends again.
Example 5 – mAx 6;5
c’est deux amis qui se disent bonjour et il y en a un qui trébuche contre une 
pierre et il pousse l’autre et après l’autre, il se relève, et après l’autre il le re-
pousse/ après il montre la pierre du doigt pour savoir qui l’a fait trébucher/ 
après l’autre il l’aide à se relever.
It’s two friends who say hello and there’s one who trips over a stone and he 
pushes the other one and then the other one, he gets up, and then the other he 
pushes him back / then he points to the stone to know who made him trip / 
then the other he helps him get up.
Example 6 – mAR 10;1
ben alors ça parle de deux p(e)tits garçons / i se disent bonjour et puis euh y 
en a un qui heurte une pierre / et euh donc euh comme il heurte une pierre et 
ben y va / i trébuche sur l’autre et puis l’autre i croit qu’il a fait exprès donc 
y commence à euh à / à mh à l(e) bousculer et puis après i tombe sur la pierre 
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et mh/ i pleure et puis et donc i pleure /alors lui il voit qu’il a pas fait exprès/ 
donc il l’aide à se remonter.
Well then this tells about two l’il boys / they say hello to each other and then 
uh there’s one who bumps against a stone / and uh the uh since he bumps a 
stone and well he uh / he trips on the other one  and then the other he thinks 
he did it on purpose so he begins to uh to / to mm to push him and then later 
he falls on the stone and mm / he cries and then and so he cries /  so him he 
sees that  he didn’t do it on purpose / so he helps him get back up.
Reference to internal states of the characters
As one can see in Figure 1, up to 9 years children express rarely the internal 
states of the characters in their initial narratives, a result that is in accord with earlier 
studies (Bamberg, 1991; Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; Charman & Shmueli-goetz, 
1998; Eaton et al., 1999; Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 2004; Bokus, 2004).
In their narratives after scaffolding, these references increase significantly for 
the whole group of children (χ2(3) =  83.99, p < 0.001), as well as for each age group 
starting at 6-7 years3. 4-5 year olds, however, continue to tell descriptive narratives 
and do not increase at all their references to internal states.
Concerning the types of internal states mentioned, Figure 2 shows that, before 
scaffolding, physical sensations are the internal states most frequently expressed, 
with epistemic states following closely4. After scaffolding, all types of internal states 
increase significantly (except physical states), with epistemic states showing the 
3 For the 6-7 yr olds: χ2 (1) = 33.8; for the 8-9 yr olds: χ2(1) = 32.14; for the 10-11 yr olds: χ2(1) = 18.05, all 
significant at p < 0.001).
4 The mean scores are obtained by dividing the total number of each type of internal state mentioned by 
the total number of subjects.
Figure 1.  Average number of references to internal states before and after the scaffolding 
procedure, by age group
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largest increase (for phy:  χ2(1)  = 1.78, n.s.; for emot: χ2(1) = 10.67, p < 0.001; for int: 
χ2(1) = 24.2, p < 0.001; for epi: χ2(1) = 33.3, p < 0.001). 
Differences are however noticeable as a function of the age of the children5 
(see Figure 3).
5 The mean scores are obtained by dividing the total number of each type of internal state mentioned by 
each age group by the number of subjects in the corresponding age group.
Figure 2.  Average number of references to different types of internal states before and after 
scaffolding for the whole group of subjects
Figure 3.  Average number of references to different types of internal states before and after 
scaffolding, by age group
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Figure 4.  Percentage of children making reference to at least one epistemic state before and 
after scaffolding, by age group
Before scaffolding, 4-5 year olds refer only to physical and/or emotional states6 
while 10-11 year olds speak most about epistemic states. After scaffolding, with the 
exception of 4-5 year olds, all children talk significantly more about the characters’ 
epistemic states. Relative to an expectation of no change7, the chi-square values for 
the three groups are all significant8. After scaffolding, 6-7 and 8-9 year olds mention 
epistemic states more than 10-11 year olds do in their narrative before scaffolding. 
Children of these three age groups, and in particular 6-7 year olds, also increase their 
references to physical and emotional (“phem”) states and to intentional states. 
For epistemic states, the same results are found when one considers the chil-
dren individually (see Figure 4).  After scaffolding, the proportion of children who 
produce at least one epistemic state increases significantly across the group as a 
whole (χ2(1) = 4.54, p < 0.05) and progressively from 6-7 to 10-11 years of age, with 
6 to 9 year olds referring to at least one epistemic state after scaffolding, as much 
as 10-11 year old children do before scaffolding. 
Functions of internal states in the narratives
What function do internal state references fulfill in the children’s narratives? 
most of the internal states mentioned are implicated in explanatory relations. This 
is the case for 65% and 84% of the internal states mentioned, respectively before 
and after scaffolding, a difference that is significant (χ2(1) = 4.185, p < 0.05). 
As can be seen in Figure 5, which presents results by age group, 4-5 year olds do 
not use internal states for explanatory purposes, neither before nor after scaffolding. 
Instead, from 6 years onwards, the large majority of internal states are involved in 
6 These two categories which do not involve the dimensions of desire or belief, characteristics specific to 
theory of mind, have been grouped and appear as “phem” in the graphs.
7 The chi-square tests before/after scaffolding were carried out with a no change h0 expectation.
8 The chi-square values for the three groups are as follows: for the 6-7 year olds – χ2(1) = 8.33, p < 0.001; 
for the 8-9 year olds – χ2(1) = 81, p < 0.001; for the 10-11 year olds – χ2(1) = 4.5, p < 0.05.
13ExPlAInIng EVEntS In nARRAtIVES
explanatory relationships, a functional use that increases after scaffolding reach-
ing 92% of the internal states mentioned by 8 to 11 years olds children. Instead, 
the internal states expressed by 4-5 year olds do not have explanatory functions. 
This suggests that, at around 6-7 years, when internal states become motors and 
consequences of behavior, an important change occurs in the way internal states 
are apprehended by the children.
Considering that internal states can be the cause, the consequence, or both 
the consequence of an event and the cause of another, the explanatory function 
they fulfill most often is that of the cause or motivation of behavior, before as well 
as after scaffolding (before scaffolding:  χ2(2) = 19.87, p < .001; after scaffolding: 
χ2(2) = 60.27, p < .001) (see Figure 6). At the same time, it is interesting to note that 
Figure 5.  Percentage of internal states involved in explanatory relationships, 
before and after scaffolding, by age group
Figure 6:  Percentage of internal states used as cause, as consequence or as consequence of 
one event and cause for another, before and after scaffolding, for all the children
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most of the children’s explanations have an internal state as a component, both 
before and after scaffolding (see Veneziano & hudelot, 2005b).
After scaffolding, internal states are also mentioned by several children as hav-
ing the double function of consequence for one event and of cause for another, as 
in the following example:
Example 7 – lEA 8;6
 i tombe sur l’autre // alors l’autre i croit qu’i l’a fait / exprès / alors il le pousse 
// sur le caillou
he falls on the other // so the other one believes he did it / on purpose / so he 
pushes him on the pebble
The expression of false belief and its correction
As mentioned under 2.4.4, the false belief was coded when the child not only 
talked about the character’s belief but mentioned also the state of the world which, 
being different from the belief, made the latter appear false.
Before scaffolding, only a child of 8-9 years and three children of 10-11 years 
express a false belief (see Figure 7). Instead, after scaffolding there is a significant 
increase in the expression of FB as it is produced by one child of 6-7 years, four of 
8-9 and seven of 10-11 years (for all the subjects: χ2(1) = 3.9, p < .05).
Concerning the rectification of the FB, before scaffolding it is only expressed 
by four 10-11 years old children (see Figure 7).  After scaffolding, the number of 
children who mention the RFB incre ases among the 10-11 year olds (6 instead of 4), 
Figure 7:  number of children expressing a false belief (FB) and the rectification of the false 
belief (RFB), by age group
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and it is expressed by three 8-9 and one 6-7 year olds, groups where no mention 
appeared before scaffolding.
The rectification of the false belief is mentioned by these children to explain the 
final reconciliation between the characters: c’est pas moi euh / c’est l(e) caillou qui 
m’a fait trébucher et alors après i i s(e) donnent la main … et pis i s(e) réconcilient 
(it wasn’t me uh / it was the pebble that made me trip and so then they shake hands 
… and then they make it up).
It is noteworthy that the RFB, more demanding than the expression of internal 
states or of the FB, because of the explicit reference to the different points of view 
of the characters, appears the latest in the initial narrative
Discussion
In the narrative before scaffolding, some 4-5 year old children can talk about the 
physical and emotional states of the characters, such as “seeing” and “hurting”, and 
a few 6-7 year olds can refer to their intentional and epistemic states. however, in 
accord with other studies (Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 2004; Kielar-turska, 1999; Bam-
berg & Damrad-Frye, 1991;  Küntay & nakamura, 2004), the expression of the false 
belief of one of the characters begins to appear only around 8-9 years and it is still 
not widespread in the first narratives of 10-11 year old children.  moreover, only a 
few of these children express the rectification of the false belief and the resolution 
of the misunderstanding.  
Thus, the particular content of the Stone story does not elicit from the children 
a greater attribution of epistemic states, of false belief nor of its rectification.
After a non-intrusive scaffolding focusing children’s attention on the causes of 
the events, but without any direct or indirect reference to the internal states of the 
characters, starting at 6-7 years children talk more frequently about the characters’ 
internal states, particularly epistemic, to such an extent that they catch up with the 
initial narratives of the 10-11 year old children.  In the same way, 6-7 year olds start 
to express the false belief and 8-9 year old children express both the false belief 
and its rectification as much as 10-11 year olds do in the initial narratives.  The 
increase in the expression of the FB and of the RFB is also notable in 10-11 year 
olds: respectively 70% and 60% of these children do it in their second narrative.
how to explain the effect of our scaffolding procedure on 6-7 year olds and, 
even more substantially, on children from 8 years onwards? It can be supposed 
that children between 6 and 9 years can be helped by a prior segmentation of the 
events and by a reflection on the reasons and causes of these same events. Eaton 
et al.’s study (1999) showed that segmentation of the temporal succession of events 
and questions about their causes and about the characters’ moods, lead even some 
5 year olds to talk about the mental states of the characters and to involve them in 
explanatory relationships. In their study, however, children didn’t have to handle a 
monological narrative with its multiple requirements. In the present study, children 
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are helped also in their monological narrative even though, unlike in the Eaton et al. 
study, children are not solicited to think about the internal states of the characters. 
Indeed, starting from 6 years, children make notable progress in the attribution 
of epistemic states and in their seeing them behind the actions of the characters. 
moreover, they progress also in the attribution of a false belief that expresses in a 
more or less explicit way the contrasting points of view of the two characters, and 
implies a more explicitly available “interpretative” theory of mind (Chandler & 
Carpendale, 1998; Carpendale & lewis, 2006). It should be kept in mind that neither 
the internal states of the characters nor this double perspective on the events was 
the object of scaffolding. moreover, Veneziano, Albert & martin (2009) show that 
the beneficial effect is specific to the intervention procedures used and not to the 
simple fact of retelling the story a second time.
more then helping children accomplish what they could not have done alone, 
the scaffolding procedure devised for this research seems to function as a catalyst for 
competences that do not manage to manifest themselves when children are dealing 
with multidimensional complex tasks, as is the case of monological narratives.
These results raise legitimate questions about the meaning of the limited ex-
pression of false belief in the spontaneous initial narratives of 9-10 year olds, in 
this as well as in similar studies (e.g., Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 2004; Bamberg, 1991). 
Certainly, children who make progress in their narrative after scaffolding are there 
to show that they master the conceptual tools to talk about others’ mental states. 
The complexity of the task and the innumerable skills needed to create a coherent 
and understandable story based on a few images can explain the fact that the men-
talistic, interpretive, attitude required, still in development (Chandler, 2001), does not 
manifest itself clearly in the story (Aksu-Koç & tekdemir, 2004).  An interactional 
scaffolding procedure like the one used in this study succeeds in favorably leading 
children to dig into their deep-seated competences also in these circumstances. The 
procedure might work as a “harness” that allows the child to make better use of 
his skills in the face of the multiple demands that constrain his functioning rather 
then helping them develop new skills.
The ineffectiveness of the scaffolding in children 4-5 years old and the weak 
results shown by the 6-7 year olds suggest that there might be room for other 
kinds of interventions. If children who might have probably succeeded one Theory 
of mind task (for example, the “deceptive box” task of Perner, leekam & Wim-
mer, 1987; see Veneziano et al., 2009) could be led to talk about the characters’ 
epistemic and intentional states by questioning them about the causes of events, 
4-5 year olds might need a scaffolding procedure targeted directly and explicitly 
on the epistemic states of the characters in order to make progress.  It could also 
be, however, that the child’s level of cognitive development does not permit too 
radical changes in the approach to story-telling, no matter the type of external 
intervention one sets up.  On this point it is useful to remember that both the 
Piagetian notion of schema (e.g., Piaget, 1975), and the Vygotskian concept of 
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internalization (e.g., Vygotski, 1985) imply cognitive reorganizations at a deep-
seated level and not a simple copy that would go from an external model to an 
internal representation (Symons, 2004).
Above all, the effect of the scaffolding procedure shown by this study, strongly 
plead for the necessity of evaluating children’s competences in different ways before 
drawing conclusions about their real abilities or potentialities.
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Appendix 1
a. The pictures of the “Stone  story”
b. The coded events
Image 1 The greeting: two characters, P1 and P2, meet, greet each other
Image 2 The stumble: P1 stumbles on a stone 
 The first push: P1 pushes P2 
Image 3 The counter-push: P2 pushes back P1 
Image 4 The fall: P1 falls to the ground 
 The pointing: P1 points to the stone 
 The crying: P1 cries 
Image 5 The reconciliation: P2 holds out his hand to P1
